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Respondents Sheet M€ital Systems and Transamerica
Premier Insurance (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Sheet
Metal Systems") file this response to Utah Tile and Roofing and
CNA Insurance Company's (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"Utah Tile")'s Petition for Review on appeal from the Industrial
Commission of Utah ("Commission").
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over the Petition for
Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-l-303(6) (1997), § 6346b-16(l) (1997), and § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1996),
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

ISSUE.

The issue is whether to affirm the

Commission7s decision that Kevin Day's accident of December 7,
1993 while working for Sheet Metal Systems did not amount to an
"unusual or extraordinary exertion," and thus was not the legal
cause of any resulting injury.

This issue is analyzed and

reviewed in two steps:
First, the agency must determine as a matter
of fact exactly what were the employmentrelated activities of the injured employee.
Second, the agency must decide whether those
activities amounted to an unusual or
extraordinary exertion.
Hilton Hotel v. Indus. Comm'n, 897 P.2d 352, 355 (Utah Ct. App.
1995) (quoting Price River Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 731 P.2d
1079, 1082 (Utah 1986)).

Utah Tile's appeal addresses both

steps, and each has its own stctndard of review.

-1-

2.

STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW,

The Court should

show deference to the Commission's determinations on each part of
the two-part review:
A,

Findings of Fact,

The Commission's findings

of fact as to the December 7, 1993 incident must be accepted if
they are "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light
of the whole record before the court."
16(4)(g) (1997).

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-

"Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla

of evidence, but less than the weight of the evidence."

Grace

Drilling Co. v. Board of Rev., 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
B.

Application of the Law.

The Commission's

conclusion that the December 7, 1993 incident was not an "unusual
or extraordinary exertion" is a mixed question involving the
application of the law to the facts.

Price River, 731 P.2d at

1082; accord Stouffer Foods Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 801 P.2d 179,
181 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Smith & Edwards Co. v. Indus. Comm'n,
770 P.2d 1016, 1017 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

The Commission's

decision on this issue, and particularly in this case, should be
given substantial deference according to recent cases from the
Utah Supreme Court, Utah Court of Appeals, and to past cases in
point.

See, e.g.. Drake v. Indus. Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181-84

(Utah 1997); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994);
Caporoz v. Indus. Comm'n, 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah Ct. App. 1997);
Stouffer, 801 P.2d at 181.
-2-

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
The determinative statutes and regulations are
adequately set forth on pages 2-3 of Utah Tile / s brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The nature of the ceise and course of proceedings are
adequately described on pages 3-5 of Utah Tile's brief.
Statement of Facts
Kevin Day had four back injuries or recurrences from
March 18, 1992 to December 7, 1993.

(R. 567-69.)

The first

three occurred while he was employed with Utah Tile.
67.)

(R. 565-

The fourth, on December 7, 1993, occurred while he was

employed by Sheet Metal Systems.

(R. 568.)

Mr. Day's first injury on March 18, 1992 occurred when
he was working for Utah Tile, helping another employee lift a
3 00-pound roll of rubber from the ground to the roof of a
building when he felt two "excruciating" pops in his back,
dropped his rope, and fell back onto his buttocks.
318.)

(R. 264, 283,

He reported the injury and sought and obtained medical

treatment.

(R. 567.)

Mr. Day's second injury occurred on March 23, 1992,
when he was lifting a piece of sheet metal with Utah Tile.

(Id.)

His third injury occurred on January 13, 1993, when he
slipped and fell carrying a load of sheet metal for Utah Tile.
He testified that he lay on his back for about an hour because of
the pain.

(Id.)
-3-

Significantly, on October 27, 1993, Mr. Day reported
that his back pain had not disappeared since his first injury in
March 1992, and his examining physician, Dr. John Schlegel, M.D.,
noted that Mr. Day's signs and symptoms were consistent with a
discogenic pain pattern and recommended an MRI scan.

(R. 568.)

Prior to that MRI being taken, however, Mr. Day had the incident
on December 7, 1993 with Sheet Metal Systems.
Utah Tile's statement that Mr. Day "seriously injured"
his back on December 7, 1993, Petr.'s Br. at 6, is unsupported by
the record.

There has been no such finding by the ALJ, the

medical panel, or the Commission.

Such a statement is simply

calculated to try to influence the Court's perception of
Mr. Day's incident of December 7, 1993, since it is the
"exertion" related to that incident that is at issue.
A medical panel was convened to resolve medical aspects

. . .

t

of this case and its findings were adopted by the ALJ and the
Commission.

(R. 571, 624.)

The panel concluded, among other

things, that "[Mr. Day's] initial injury on March 18, 1992 began
the sequence of problems from which he continues to have
difficulties."

(R. 569.)

The medical panel further concluded

that "it is impossible to determine specifically the date of
onset of the first L5-S1 abnormality."

(R. 571.)

Interestingly,

however, the medical panel report includes the following
description of Mr. Day's December 7, 1993 incident with Sheet
-4-

Metal Systems, purportedly based on Mr, Day's representations to
the panel:
"He describes sitting down on the roof and
letting himself down to the ground, . . ."
(R. 548) (emphasis added).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah Tile/s appeal fails for two simple reasons.
First, the Commissions findings of fact on the December 7, 1993
incident are well-supported by substantial evidence —

chiefly,

(1) Mr. Day's own testimony, cind (2) a physical demonstration by
defense counsel during the heatring which, according to Mr. Day,
was "exactly" like what he did on December 7, 1993. No
objections were made to the demonstration at the hearing, and
since it cannot be "reviewed" through the written transcript, it
must be presumed to support the Commission's findings.
Second, the Commissions application of the "unusual or
extraordinary exertion" standard to the facts is sustainable
under any standard of review.

The Commission should be given

discretion and deference to apply this legal standard, and
particularly in the present case because of the potential
significance to the outcome of the demonstrative evidence at the
hearing, which is not reviewable through the appellate record.
In any event, the Commissions conclusion that a drop of
effectively 18 inches —
evidence —

a finding supported by substantial

is not an "unusual or extraordinary exertion" is

-5-

plainly reasonable and correct.

Utah Tile fails to provide

argument or authority which support a different result from that
reached by the ALJ and the Commission.

The order of the

Industrial Commission should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE DECEMBER 7, 1993
INCIDENT WAS NOT AN "UNUSUAL OR EXTRAORDINARY EXERTION"
The issue on appeal is whether the Commission correctly
found no "unusual or extraordinary exertion," and thus no legal
causation, in connection with Mr. Day's December 7, 1993 incident
with Sheet Metal Systems.1

There are two steps to the analysis:

First, the agency must determine as a matter
of fact exactly what were the employmentrelated activities of the injured employee.
Second, the agency must decide whether those
activities amounted to an unusual or
extraordinary exertion.
Hilton, 897 P.2d at 355 (quoting Price River. 731 P.2d at 1082).
A.

The Commission7s findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence.

The Commission adopted the factual findings of the ALJ.
(R. 624.)

Those findings need only be supported by "substantial

1

Under Utah worker's compensation law, for an "injury" to
be compensable, there must be "proof of a causal connection
between the injury and the worker's employment duties," which
requires proof of both "legal causation" and "medical causation."
Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. In Allen, the Court said, "where a
claimant suffers from a pre-existing condition which contributes
to the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is required
to prove legal causation." Id. (emphasis added).
-6-

evidence," not the weight of the evidence, to be upheld.

Utah

Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g).
Utah Tile's main complaint is that it claims there is
no evidence that Mr. Day actually lowered himself toward the
ground from his four-foot perch to reduce the distance of his
jump, hop, fall, dismount, or whatever.

Thus, it contends that

the Commission found in error that the "effective" height of the
jump was 18 inches, or one and a half feet.

(R. 568, 624.)

To the contrary, there are at least two sources of
substantial evidence supporting the Commission's findings in this
regard: (1) Mr. Day's direct testimony; and (2) a physical
demonstration by Mr. Tom Sturdy, counsel for Sheet Metal Systems
at the hearing on this matter, found in the same passage.
Specifically, Mr. Sturdy climbed up onto a table or ledge to
discuss with Mr. Day "how you actually jumped down off of this"
(R. 315):
Q.
BY MR. STURDY:
that right?
JUDGE SIMS:
footprints.

So you are on this roof; is

We'll bill you if there are any

MR. STURDY: I'll come back with my Windex
and clean it, Your Honor.
Q.
And so one of the theories, I suppose, is
that you just jumped down from this height, four feet
up, but that's not how it happened?
A.

No.

Q.
You squatted down on your hands and then
jumped like this; is that right?
-7-

A.

Exactly,

How did you know that?

Q.

I asked you in your deposition.

A.

Okay.

Q.

How long are your legs?

A.

My legs are probably not more than 50 inches.

Q.

No, your inseam.

A.

Oh, my inseam?

Q.

Your wife may know.

A.

32 inches.

Q.
All right. So you have a 32-inch inseam. So
when vou are at this point on your hands and jumped
down, your legs pretty much covered the distance for
you, didn't they?
A.

Just about.

Q.
So you've got about a four-foot height.
That's 48 inches, 32-inch inseam, and vou dropped
actually about 16 inches; is that right?
A.

That sounds right.

(R. 315-17.) (emphasis added).
Utah Tile argues that because Mr. Day never said he
brought his legs to a complete stop while they were 18 inches of
the ground, the "physical reality" of his maneuver must have been
equivalent to a four-foot jump.

However, the "exertion" related

to Mr. Day's descent and landing in the soft dirt below would
have necessarily been a function of several things, including to
what extent he may have dangled his legs over the side before

-8-

dropping, or to what extent he used his arms to slow his descent,
or how he landed with his feet and knees.
The best evidence of how Mr. Day exited from the fourfoot roof was the live demonstration by Mr. Sturdy, since Mr. Day
said it resembled his actions "exactly."

(R. 316.)

The

demonstration, however, is not subject to review on appeal.
However, the ALJ clearly witnessed the demonstration, and such
evidence appears to have influenced the ALJ's findings of fact,
which were adopted by the Commission:
7.
On December 7, 1993, Mr. Day used his hands
to assist him in getting off a four feet high wall
while working for Sheet Metal Systems. He squatted
down, placed the palms of his hands on either side of
his feet, and used his hands and arms to lower his body
straight down to the ground which was soft because it
had been plowed. He claims that this injured his back.
The evidence shows that the effective height from which
he jumped was about one and one-half feet. The
applicant argued that this was a jump from four feet.
The evidence shows that it was clearly not a clean jump
from four feet, and that Mr. Day used his hands and
arms to assist him to lower himself to the ground from
the four foot height.
(R. 568, 624) (emphasis added).
Sheet Metal Systems submits that between Mr. Day's
testimony and Mr. Sturdy's demonstration, which must be presumed
to have supported the ALJ's findings since it cannot be reviewed
on appeal, there was ample evidence supporting the Commission's
findings.
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B.

The Commission reasonably and correctly applied
the "unusual or extraordinary exertion" standard
to the facts of this case.

Utah Tile also challenges the Commission's application
of the "unusual and extraordinary exertion" standard to the
facts.

Utah Tile's arguments almost exclusively start from the

premise that Mr. Day was injured by a four-foot jump, not, as the
Commission and ALJ found, by a drop effectively of about 18
inches.

Nowhere does Utah Tile argue that a drop of about 18

inches would be an "unusual or extraordinary exertion."2

Thus,

if the Court upholds the Commission's finding that Mr. Day's drop
on December 7, 1993 was effectively about 18 inches (into soft
dirt with a good landing) —
testimony —

which is supported by Mr. Day's own

then no further analysis is necessary to affirm the

Commission.
If the Court finds the evidence not to uphold the
finding of an effective drop of 18 inches, or if Utah Tile
challenges such finding as constituting an "unusual or
extraordinary exertion" in any event, then Court must review the
Commission's application of the standard to the facts.

In doing

so, recent decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and this Court

2

Such a drop could be compared to a number of typical
nonemployment activities, such as stepping off a step stool,
hopping off a bus, climbing out of a pickup truck or sportutility vehicle, or skipping the last stair on a walk down the
stairs.
-10-

suggest giving substantial deference to the Commission/s
decision.
The Utah Supreme Court recently analyzed standards of
review in Drake, 939 P.2d at 181-84, and suggested that even if
the standard is one of "correctness" in the abstract, the
application of certain legal standards to facts may properly
"convey a measure of discretion to [the Commission] when applying
that standard to a given set of facts."

Id. at 182 (quoting

Pena, 869 P.2d at 939). The Pena case, which Drake follows,
identified "three reasons that are useful in discerning when some
degree of discretion ought to be left to [the Commission]:"
(i) when the facts to which the legal rule is
to be applied are so complex and varying that
no rule adequately addressing the relevance
of all these facts can be spelled out;
(ii) when the situation to which the legal
principle is to be applied is sufficiently
new to the courts that appellate judges are
unable to anticipate and articulate
definitively what factors should be outcome
determinative; and (iii) when the trial judge
has observed "facts," such as a witness's
appearance and demeanor, relevant to the
application of the law that cannot be
adequately reflected in the record available
to the appellate courts.
Pena, 869 P.2d at 938-39 (emphasis added).

In Drake, the Court

found the first two reasons relevant to the "special errand" rule
and, consequently, gave "heightened deference to the Commission,"
according "a strong presumption" that the Commission's decision
was correct.

Drake, 939 P.2d at 182, 184.

-11-

The same result is appropriate for decisions under the
"unusual or extraordinary exertion" standard, and in any event,
the Court should grant particular deference to the Commission's
result in this case in light of the strong presence of the third
factor described in Pena: the ALJ's opportunity to observe
"facts" and "evidence" that cannot be ascertained from the
appellate record.

(R. 315-17.)

As discussed above, the ALJ's

opportunity to observe Mr. Sturdy's demonstration, which Mr. Day
endorsed as an "exact" reproduction of his December 7, 1993
incident, puts the ALJ and Commission in a position in applying
the legal standard to the facts that the reviewinq court cannot
replicate.
Consequently, pursuant to Drake, the Commission's
conclusion finding Mr. Day's incident with Sheet Metal Systems
not to have been a compensable accident should be granted
substantial deference and a "strong presumption" of correctness.
See Drake, 939 P.2d at 184.
Similarly, though not applying the Drake/Pena analysis,
the Utah Court of Appeals' most recent statement of the standard
for reviewing the Commission's application of the law to facts
also applied a deferential standard —

looking only to ensure

that the Commission's decision falls within the "broad bounds of
reasonableness."

Caporoz, 945 P.2d at 144.

In Caporoz, the

panel applied the Morton analysis of agency review, see Morton
Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah 1991),
-12-

which looks for an explicit or implicit grant of discretion to
the agency.

The panel unanimously held that the Commission is

explicitly granted broad discretion in its "application of the
law to facts" (as distinguished from "interpreting the law")
under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-16(1) (1994) (renumbered § 34A-1-301
(1997)).

Thus, while using slightly different terminology, the

Court of Appeals and Supreme Court are basically consistent in
granting deference to the Commissions application of the law to
specific facts.3
To the extent Utah Tile may argue for a nondeferential
review by suggesting a "correction-of-error" review and citing
Drake and Crapo v. Indus. Common, 922 P.2d 39 (Utah Ct. App.
1996), see Petr's Br. at 1, Utah Tile has the wrong standard.
As discussed above, the articulation of a "correctness" standard
in Drake only began the analysis, which resulted in substantial
deference to the Commission and its application of the "special
errand" rule.

939 P.2d at 181-84.

Meanwhile, there are several problems with relying on
Crapo for the standard of review.

3

First, a more recent panel of

Historically, Utah courts have applied a deferential
standard of review to the Commission7s application of the
"unusual and extraordinary exertion" standard. See, e.g.,
Stouffer, 801 P.2d at 181 ("reasonable and rational" standard);
Nyrehn v. Indus. Comm'n, 800 P.2d 330, 333 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(same); Sisco Hilte v. Indus. Comm'n, 766 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988) (same); see also American Roofing v. Indus.
Comm'n, 752 P.2d 912, 915 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("arbitrary and
capricious" standard).
-13-

the Court of Appeals (including the author of Crapo) expressly
declined to follow Crapo's statement of the standard of review.
See Caporoz, 945 P.2d at 143 (Commission's application of the law
should be reviewed only for "reasonableness").

Second, the cases

Crapo relies upon for the standard of review —

Cross v. Board of

Review, 824 P.2d 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) and King v. Indus.
Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) —

were expressly

distinguished and not followed by the more recent Caporoz.
P.2d at 143.

945

Third, the other two judges on the Crapo panel also

have joined an opinion conflicting with Crapo on the standard of
review.

See VanLeeuwen v. Indus. Comm'n, 901 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah

Ct. App. 1995) (Commission's application of the law should be
reviewed for "reasonableness").
Similarly, Utah Tile's reliance on Miera v. Indus.
Comm'n, 728 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1986) is also misplaced.

Utah Tile

incorrectly suggests that there is "nothing in the reasoning of
Miera to suggest that the number of jumps was particularly
significant."

Petr's. Br. at 20.

To the contrary, the only

reasoning in Miera concerning the application of the "unusual and
extraordinary exertion" standard referred to the frequency of
jumps, a fact simply not present and substantially
distinguishable from the facts as found by the Commission in this
case.

See Miera, 728 P.2d at 1025 ("His jumps into an eight-foot

hole from a four-foot platform at thirty-minute intervals

-14-

constitute a considerably greater exertion than that encountered
in non-employment life and are therefore legally sufficient.11).
Utah Tile fails to provide argument or authority which
support a different result from that reached by the ALJ and the
Commission.

The order of the Industrial Commission should be

affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments Respondents request
that the Order of the Industrial Commission be affirmed.
DATED this 1£-

day of December, 1997.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

2^L

\^£/^^^

Eric D. Barton
Attorneys for Respondents
Sheet Metal Systems and
Transamerica Premier Insurance
EDB 261308
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Theodore E. Kanell
Stephen P. Horvat
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE
#4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970
Alan Hennebold
Labor Commission of Utah
P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615
Preston Handy
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN
5684 South Green Street
Murray, UT 84123
DATED t h i s / / - d a y

o f December,

1997.

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

E r i c D, Barton
Attorneys for Respondents
Sheet Metal Systems and
Transamerica Premier Insurance
EDB.261308
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